Manchester United and the Mid-Season No.9 Gamble: Fragile Sesko, Guirassy Back on the Radar
**Core answer:** Man Utd đối mặt nguy cơ thiếu tiền đạo cắm sau khi Benjamin Sesko vắng mặt ở trận hòa Fulham 1-1. Serhou Guirassy của Borussia Dortmund trở lại tầm ngắm cho kỳ chuyển nhượng tháng Giêng, nhưng mức giá mới và tiền sử chấn thương biến thương vụ này thành một canh bạc tài chính. **Key facts:** - Benjamin Sesko vắng mặt nhiều lần từ khi gia nhập Man Utd; không thi đấu trong trận hòa 1-1 trước Fulham. - Serhou Guirassy ghi 4 bàn trong 6 trận cho Borussia Dortmund mùa này. - Điều khoản giải phóng 40 triệu euro của Guirassy đã hết hiệu lực sau kỳ chuyển nhượng hè. - Man Utd không mua tiền đạo cắm ở hè, dồn nguồn lực cho tuyến giữa. - Guirassy 30 tuổi, có tiền sử chấn thương, không khớp chiến lược dài hạn của INEOS. **Source attribution:** Tổng hợp báo chí Indonesia đưa tin về chuyển nhượng Man Utd (tháng 10 năm 2025) | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A:** Q: Vì sao Man Utd không mua tiền đạo cắm trong kỳ chuyển nhượng hè? A: Ban tuyển dụng tin rằng Joshua Zirkzee, Bryan Mbeumo và Matheus Cunha đủ đảm nhiệm vị trí cao nhất trên hàng công, nên ưu tiên nguồn lực cho tuyến giữa. Q: Dortmund có còn nghĩa vụ bán Guirassy ở mức 40 triệu euro? A: Không, điều khoản giải phóng đã hết hiệu lực nên Dortmund có thể yêu cầu mức giá cao hơn trong tháng Giêng. Q: Rủi ro lớn nhất của thương vụ Guirassy là gì? A: Tiền sử chấn thương và tuổi 30 khiến hợp đồng dài hạn khó có giá trị bán lại, theo chỉ số chiều sâu đội hình của VangBong.vn.
At Carrington, Friday's session ran twenty minutes long. Benjamin Sesko left the second pitch through the side gate, alone, his training jacket zipped to the neck. He did not pass through the interview area. Nobody from the media team called him back. A member of the coaching staff said one short sentence to the reporters waiting there: “He needs more time.”
Three days later, Sesko's name was not on the team sheet. Manchester United left Craven Cottage with a 1-1 draw against Fulham. In the stand, I sat beside two English colleagues who have covered this club for more than twenty years. None of us talked about the goal. We talked about the bench: Joshua Zirkzee sitting there, head down, hands clasped, and when the final whistle went he was the last man to stand. Crowds remember goals; I remember the eyes of a substitute when the whistle blows. That is what I carried back to the hotel, not the scoreline.
I keep the rhythm of a team not with a drum, but by never missing a training session in thirty years. My job is to stand at the edge of the pitch and record what never makes the broadcast: who arrives early, who leaves late, who spends ten extra minutes with the fitness coach. At Carrington in recent weeks, the man doing the extra minutes is the one the team needs most.
The summer decision and what it cost
A season opens with a heartbeat in the press room, before the first whistle. Last summer, Manchester United chose a very clear direction: no additional out-and-out striker. Recruitment resources went into midfield, on the argument that the squad already had Zirkzee, Bryan Mbeumo and Matheus Cunha, three players capable of operating at the top of the attack.
On paper, it was a bet in step with the times. Modern football has drifted away from the model of one target man, one focal point. Leading European clubs use rotating forward lines in which the No.9 role is a zone rather than a fixed name. Zirkzee drops deep and holds the ball up, Mbeumo attacks the space behind full-backs, Cunha drives infield from the left. On paper, the three cover for each other.
On grass, that coverage only works if at least one of them agrees to live inside the penalty area. The 1-1 draw at Craven Cottage was a miniature of the problem: United controlled more of the ball, circulated better across the middle two-thirds, but when the ball reached the box, nobody occupied the far post. Nobody pinned a centre-back so someone else could find space.
There was noise around that match too. Harry Maguire spoke out about the team's problems after the London result. Matheus Cunha stated plainly that United must not be satisfied with a single point. On the Fulham side, the debate around the ball striking Calvin Bassey's hand left pundits asking why United were not awarded a penalty, with the Fulham manager reacting sharply to the officiating. All of that commotion covered a simpler reality: the team still has nobody reliable enough to play at the top of the attack in matches that demand a goal.
From where I watch, this is the kind of problem that rarely solves itself. The No.9 position is not a place for long experiments by rotation. It is where pressure accumulates fastest, and where a squad's confidence is deposited.
The No.9 is a function, not a name
Based on my experience covering matches across many seasons, there are three tasks a centre-forward at a major club must complete regardless of tactical style: hold the ball when the team transitions, attack the space behind the opposing back line, and occupy the box when delivery comes from wide.
Sesko can do all three. He is tall, quick over short distances, strong in the air and reads the movement in front of centre-backs. The problem lies elsewhere: his body has never demonstrated the load tolerance of a first-choice Premier League striker. Since joining United, Sesko has been absent several times. Each return means rebuilding a fitness base from scratch, and each rebuild breaks the team's sequence at the most important position on the pitch.
This is what outside analysis rarely mentions. An injured centre-forward does not only remove goals. He changes how the whole team builds. With Sesko, United can go long and bypass the first pressing line with a single lofted pass. Without him, the team must play short, must circulate through midfield, and everything becomes slower and more predictable.
Zirkzee is a fine player, but he is a dropping No.9. He prefers receiving around thirty metres from goal, back to the target, acting as a pivot for runners beyond him. Mbeumo is the runner from the right, a cutter-inside who finishes with his left. Cunha is the structure-breaker, roaming wide, not a finisher. Together they form a fluid attack, but none of them is regularly present between the posts when a cross arrives.
That is why the argument “we have three options at No.9” sounds reasonable in a meeting room yet feels thin on grass. Three different options do not equal three solutions. They create three different problems for opponents, and sometimes for the club that owns them.
And when Sesko's problem drags on, the January door opens.
Serhou Guirassy and a familiar equation
Transfers are separations written in advance; only the tears have no draft. United have tracked Serhou Guirassy since the Guinea international was still at Stuttgart in the Bundesliga. It is not a new interest. It is a file that has sat in the recruitment drawer across several managerial regimes.
At Dortmund this season, Guirassy keeps scoring: four goals in six matches, including a night when he twice put the ball in the net against Paderborn before both were disallowed. The 30-year-old has experience, box instinct and the ability to operate independently in a forward line — exactly the profile a goal-starved side needs in the short term.
But the context has shifted since summer. Back then, Guirassy carried a release clause of 40 million euros, roughly 817.72 billion rupiah. No top club activated it. That is a signal worth considering: when a forward scoring steadily in the Bundesliga at that price goes unsold, the market is seeing something the statistics do not display.
What they saw sits in two places. The first is injury history. Guirassy has had long absences, and for a 30-year-old that risk does not shrink with time. The second is age: a long contract for a player at this stage of his career almost certainly carries no resale value, which runs against the operating principles INEOS is trying to install at Old Trafford.
Dortmund understand their position now. With the release clause expired, the club is no longer obliged to sell at a set price. They can name a high figure if United come knocking in January. They also have reason to keep him: Guirassy and Fabio Silva, who once competed for the same shirt, now form a productive partnership when paired.
That is the paradox recruitment departments meet all the time. The selling club does not want to sell, the buying club is unsure about the price, and supporters on both sides want everything done within forty-eight hours.
The outside misreading of the No.9 role
The prevailing reading in the media after the Fulham draw is simple: United need to buy a striker. I think that reading flattens the problem and could lead to an expensive mistake in January.
The core issue is not that United lack someone who can score. It is that the team does not yet generate enough high-quality situations for any striker to convert. If deliveries into the box are few and mostly from unfavourable angles, signing a 30-year-old centre-forward simply moves the problem from the forward line to the balance sheet.
The blind spot is attacking structure. In many matches, United circulate slowly across the middle two-thirds, push opponents deep and create congestion for themselves. Once the opposing back line is set, even the best centre-forward has no space to work in. Conversely, runners who attack space — players like Mbeumo — need the pass released before the defence settles.
The second misreading, in my view, treats Sesko's fitness purely as a medical matter. Part of it concerns how he is used. Sesko is asked to do too many physically demanding jobs in the same match: holding up in midfield, contesting aerial duels with centre-backs, sprinting into space, then dropping back to defend. Not many 22-year-old strikers absorb that workload in the Premier League without paying for it.
The third misreading concerns Guirassy. Dortmund losing control of the price does not automatically make the deal impossible, but it turns it into a financial gamble. For a club trying to rebuild its wage structure and create room for younger signings, a large outlay on a 30-year-old with an injury record runs against the strategic current. If it works, United have a short-term fix. If it fails, the club loses money, loses another squad slot, and sinks deeper into the cycle of emergency signings.
I have watched this type of decision many times in my career. Successful January signings are rarely the ones that satisfy an immediate craving. They are the ones that address a specific structural problem the club had already identified.
Signals to watch in the coming weeks
Before United's leadership decides whether to knock on Dortmund's door, there are a few indicators worth monitoring.
The first is how the team builds in its next four matches. If deliveries into the box remain low and arrive mainly from set pieces, pressure to buy a striker will rise regardless of results. If instead United create more quality final-third situations from quick transitions, the case for an out-and-out centre-forward weakens.
The second is Sesko's condition. Not simply whether he can play, but how many consecutive matches he can play before needing a rest. If the cycle of three games on, one game off keeps repeating, the coaching staff will have to accept that the season plan cannot revolve around him.
The third is how Dortmund handle Guirassy. If the Guirassy–Fabio Silva pairing keeps working and Dortmund climb the Bundesliga table, the January asking price will rise and the likelihood of the deal falls with it.
In a broader Asian market context, Thierry Henry travelling to Jakarta to play for the North London Legends in “The Rivalry Returns” reminds me that football does not run only on the transfer ledger. It runs on memory and longing. Vietnamese supporters who follow United do not do so because of transfer clauses. They do so out of a sense of belonging to something larger than a draw at Craven Cottage.
And that is precisely why how United handle the No.9 position in January will say more than any press release about the club's true direction under INEOS. An emergency deal for a 30-year-old is a sign of short-term panic. A structural solution — younger, perhaps less famous — is a sign of a plan being held in place.
In the next fortnight, when the squad returns to Carrington and Sesko appears again on the second pitch with the fitness coach, I will be at the east fence as always. Not to chase a scoop. But to see which member of the coaching staff walks over to him first. Sometimes the answer to a transfer problem is delivered at a training session with no crowd.
